Abstract. This paper investigates the reaction of stock prices to enactment of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA). Based on a sample of 489 high-technology firms, we find that the PSLRA was wealth-increasing, on average, and that the market reaction is more positive for firms at greatest risk of being sued in a securities class action. However, we also show that the PSLRA was less beneficial for firms likely to be the subject of a meritorious lawsuit. Collectively, our evidence implies that shareholders generally benefit from restrictions on private securities litigation, although these benefits are mitigated when other mechanisms for curbing fraudulent activity are inadequate.
In December 1995, Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), concluding a long, and often controversial, legislative effort to reform federal securities laws. Considered by some to be the most significant securities legislation in several decades, the PSLRA contains a wide variety of measures intended to protect publicly traded firms, their auditors, and other professional advisers from abusive class action litigation. The PSLRA also imposes new requirements regarding auditors' responsibility to detect and disclose fraud. Proponents of the PSLRA argued that it would benefit investors by curtailing frivolous shareholder lawsuits that require substantial corporate resources to defend or settle. Opponents countered that it would increase the incidence of fraud by effectively preventing meritorious claims from being heard in federal courts.
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The purpose of this study is to measure the effect of the PSLRA on firm value by investigating the reaction of common equity prices to its passage. Because key events late in the legislative process (i.e., a Presidential veto and subsequent Congressional override) were unexpected, our examination provides a relatively powerful test of the PSLRA's economic consequences. This study is important given recent calls by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and others for measures that provide shareholders with greater protection from financial reporting failures (e.g., AICPA, 1992 AICPA, , 1994 ; National Association of Corporate Directors, 1992; Levitt, 1998) . The PSLRA's impact on shareholder wealth is relevant to these discussions because it indicates a change in the perceived cost of an alternative disciplining mechanism, the system of private securities litigation.
Our analysis focuses on a sample of 489 firms from three industries-pharmaceuticals, computer hardware, and computer software-that are frequently the target of class action securities litigation. We draw three primary conclusions from our empirical results. First, the PSLRA was wealth-increasing, on average, for shareholders of high-technology firms. Abnormal returns associated with the veto are significantly negative, while those associated with both the House and Senate override votes are significantly positive. Second, the market reaction is more positive for firms at relatively greater risk of litigation. We estimate the firm-specific probability of litigation using a broad set of market-based and financial reporting variables as predictors of lawsuit filings.
Third, although the market response to the PSLRA is increasing in firms' overall risk of litigation, it is decreasing in the incremental probability of being sued for committing fraud. Although restricting frivolous private securities litigation is good news for shareholders, the PSLRA also makes it more difficult to pursue meritorious claims (Avery, 1996) . This is bad news for investors seeking redress for legitimate losses due to fraudulent activity. The aggregate impact of the PSLRA reflects the netting of these effects. Taken together, our evidence suggests that although the benefits of the PSLRA dominate, the market perceived its passage to be less advantageous for shareholders of firms with a high risk of being sued for committing fraud.
This study is related to Spiess and Tkac (1997) who find an overall positive reaction to enactment of the PSLRA, but no evidence linking that reaction to the perceived costs and benefits of litigation reform. In contrast to their analysis, which is based on three corporate governance variables that proxy for a firm's susceptibility to a meritorious class action suit, we document significant evidence that the market reaction is increasing in our more comprehensive measure of firms' overall litigation risk. However, the positive effect diminishes as the probability of being sued for committing fraud increases. Our findings suggest that investors benefit less from restrictions on private securities litigation when other mechanisms for curbing fraud are inadequate.
This study is also related to recent research that examines the PSLRA's impact on litigation activity (Grundfest and Perino, 1997) and the voluntary disclosure of forward-looking information (Johnson, Kasznik, and Nelson, 2000) . Our research approach complements these studies because it allows us to assess the aggregate effect of the PSLRA's many provisions, and to quantify that effect in terms of its impact on shareholder wealth. Our findings are also of interest in relation to research that documents a positive association between aggressive financial reporting and auditor litigation (e.g., Lys and Watts, 1994; Bonner, Palmrose, and Young, 1998) . We report analogous results for securities litigation against public companies, and also document that the PSLRA was less beneficial for shareholders of firms likely to be sued for financial statement fraud.
More generally, this study contributes to our understanding of the determinants of firms' litigation risk. A better understanding of these factors is important not only for firms' managers and directors, but also for their auditors. Prior research (e.g., Francis, Philbrick, and Schipper, 1994; Jones and Weingram, 1996; Skinner, 1996) focuses on a relatively limited set of market-based explanatory variables that characterize frivolous "strike" suits.
